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MODELING THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF
CARTELS WITH AN APPLICATION TO
EVALUATING COMPETITION POLICY
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Johns Hopkins University
Myong-Hun Chang
Cleveland State University
Abstract
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy
on collusion is that the cartel population is unobservable; we observe only the population
of discovered cartels. To address this challenge, a model of cartel creation and dissolution
is developed to endogenously derive the populations of cartels and discovered cartels. With
this theory, one can infer the impact of competition policy on the population of cartels by
measuring its impact on the population of discovered cartels. In particular, changes in the
duration of discovered cartels can be informative in assessing whether a new policy is reducing
the latent rate of cartels. (JEL: L13, L41)
1. Introduction
In recent years, numerous developments in antitrust and competition policy have
occurred to fight cartels. In the European Union, many member countries have
adopted more rigorous enforcement. In 1998, the European Commission pub-
lished guidelines for the determination of corporate fines for price fixing which
were then revised in 2006.1 In December 2005, the European Commission issued
a green paper on the issue of using customer damages as a penalty, which is now
a topic under intense discussion. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has also adopted new policies. The
revision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 allowed for significantly
higher fines.2 With the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act
of 2004, the statutory limit on corporate penalty was raised from $10 million to
$100 million. And perhaps the most significant policy innovation was the 1993
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revision of the Corporate Leniency Program.3 Its apparent success led the Euro-
pean Commission to adopt its own program in 1996, which was then substantively
revised in 2002.
With all of these policy changes—new guidelines for penalties, more aggres-
sive enforcement, leniency programs—it is natural to ask: What effect have they
had? The fundamental obstacle to addressing this question is that we do not
observe the population of cartels. Due to their illegality, cartels hide themselves;
we observe only the population of discovered cartels. To see the difficulties that
can arise, consider a policy that impacts both the rate of cartel formation and the
rate at which cartels are discovered. By both raising the discovery rate and reduc-
ing the number of cartels, the effect on the number of convictions is generally
ambiguous. Hence, the number of convictions could be unchanged even though
the policy is working as intended. Alternatively, the lack of change in the number
of convictions could reflect the ineffectiveness of the new policy. How are we
to judge the efficacy of a policy when the intended variable to be affected—the
cartel rate—is not observed?
The approach of this paper is to develop a model that endogenizes the popu-
lation of cartels and the population of discovered cartels and then identifies how
these two populations are related. What observable change in the population of
discovered cartels is informative as to what is happening with the frequency of
cartels? To address this question, a population of heterogeneous industries is con-
sidered and the birth and death process for cartels is modeled. Industries are given
stochastic opportunities to form a cartel and do so if it is incentive compatible.
Because of random market conditions, a cartel may persist or perish because it
is no longer incentive compatible to collude; they may also be discovered by
the antitrust or competition authorities. Cartel formation and demise is then a
stochastic process and we characterize its stationary distribution to derive a rate
of cartelization for this population of industries.
Policy changes are considered that impact the probability of detection and
conviction—such as the budget of the competition authority—and also those that
influence the size of penalties.4 For some policy changes, we find that observing
the change in the number of discovered cartels is an effective proxy for the change
in the number of cartels. For other policy changes, it is not. In the latter case, a
useful proxy proves to be the change in the duration of discovered cartels. In
particular, if discovered cartels tend to be longer in duration after a policy change
then the policy change is probably reducing cartel formation. The intuition is quite
simple. If the new policy is more efficacious then its adoption will immediately
3. For a survey on leniency programs and how this work fits into the broader literature on
enforcement, see Spagnolo (2008).
4. We also briefly describe some results—available on request—regarding the institution of a
leniency program which impacts both the probability of paying penalties and the amount of penalties.
1402 Journal of the European Economic Association
cause the marginally stable cartels to collapse which, by virtue of being marginally
stable, tend to be of relatively short duration. Their exit from the cartel population
means they cannot be discovered (though all that is necessary for the result is that
the likelihood of them being discovered is reduced by virtue of their exit). It
follows that the surviving cartels are those which tend to be more stable and thus
of longer duration. Because it is those cartels which make up the pool from which
cartels are discovered, the average duration of discovered cartels rises in the short
run in response to a more effective competition policy.
Though this project is focused on providing methods for evaluating policies
designed to fight cartels, it makes a broader contribution to the general theoret-
ical literature on collusion by modeling the birth and death process of cartels.
Despite its immensity and richness, the theory of collusion focuses on a single
industry in describing what conditions are conducive to collusion and what types
of patterns in prices and quantities are associated with collusion. Though there
is some work that endogenizes cartel formation—such as Selten (1973)—this
research has not modeled the birth and death of cartels and thus cannot address
the questions motivating this study. This paper shows how one can model the
stochastic process determining the population of cartels and use it to generate a
rate of cartelization for an economy. Independently, Miller (2009) has specified
and explored an exogenous stochastic process for cartels though cartel formation
and dissolution are not endogenized as in the current paper.
Finally, it is worth noting that the measurement problem motivating this paper
is not unique to price-fixing; it arises as well for other forms of criminal activity
including tax evasion, extortion, blackmail, and kidnapping. These types of crimes
are common in that they are often not reported; either because the victim does not
know they are being victimized (such as with price-fixing and tax evasion) or the
victim does not have an incentive to report (due to the threat of some punishment).
This creates the challenge of measuring the rate of criminal activity and assessing
the impact of a policy on the crime rate. One approach to measuring the crime
rate is to engage in random sampling. Although that may work with tax evasion, it
would be difficult to randomly sample industries for collusion or small businesses
for extortion. There is then a fundamental challenge in measuring the latent rate
of criminal activity with data based on non-random sampling.
After reviewing the model in Section 2, the cartel formation decision is
characterized in Section 3. Aggregating cartel creation and dissolution across
a heterogeneous pool of industries, the stationary distribution on cartels is
constructed in Section 4. The main results are in Section 5.
2. Model
The objective is to construct a model in which some industries collude and some
do not, some cartels collapse and some do not, some cartels are caught and some
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are not. As we are going to consider a population of industries, the model of
each industry is kept simple by using a Prisoners’ Dilemma formulation. For
each industry, there is a stochastic realization of a market’s profitability that is
summarized by the variable π ≥ 0. If firms are colluding then each firm earns π ; if
they are not colluding then each earns απ , where α ∈ [0, 1). π has a continuously
differentiable cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) H : [π, π¯ ] → [0, 1] where
0 < π < π¯ and π¯ may be finite or infinite. h(·) denotes the associated density
function. Let μ ≡ ∫ πh(π)dπ denote its finite mean. As in Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986), π is observed prior to firms deciding how to behave. If all other
firms are colluding, the profit a firm earns by deviating is ηπ where η > 1. Let
δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the common discount factor. Note that the Bertrand price game
is represented by (α, η) = (0, n) where n is the number of firms. The Cournot
quantity game with linear demand and cost functions in which firms collude at the
joint profit maximum can be represented as (α, η) = (4n/(n+1)2, (n+1)2/4n).
At the start of each period, an industry is either cartelized or not. If it was
cartelized at the end of the previous period then it is currently cartelized. If it was
not cartelized at the end of the previous period then with probability κ ∈ (0, 1)
it has an opportunity to do so.5 Given the realization of π , if firms either are not
cartelized or if collusion is not incentive compatible then each firm earns απ . If
there is a cartel and collusion is incentive compatible then each earns π .
At the end of the period, there is the random event whereby the competition
authority may pursue an investigation; this can only occur if firms colluded in the
current or previous period.6 Let σ ∈ [0, 1) denote the probability that firms are
discovered and convicted. In that case, each firm incurs a penalty of F/(1 − δ)
(so that F is the per-period penalty). For reasons of tractability, the standard
assumption in repeated game models with a competition authority is that the
penalty is fixed and thus independent of the severity of the offense.7 Given that
there is only one collusive price in our model, severity necessarily refers to the
number of periods that firms colluded. Allowing the penalty to depend on severity
would then mean having, for each cartel, a state variable which is the length
of time of collusion. The introduction of that state variable would be a serious
complication of the model and suggests why, in previous models, the penalty
is instead assumed fixed. We have, however, found a tractable specification that
5. That κ < 1 may be because cartelization requires having a set of managers willing to break the
law or that feel they can communicate and trust each other or an opportunity arises to communicate
without much risk of being caught.
6. It is natural to suppose that the likelihood of being caught declines with the length of time since
firms colluded. For example, discovery may be due to suspicions of uninvolved employees but they
are less likely to become suspicious as the flow of fresh evidence is cut off due to the cartel no longer
operating. Having the decay occur immediately after one period is a simplification that improves
tractability since otherwise it would require introducing a state variable which is the time at which
firms last colluded.
7. For a review of some of this work, see Spagnolo (2008).
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allows the penalty to depend on the average severity: The penalty is assumed to be
proportional to the average increase in profit from being cartelized (rather than the
realized increase in profit). If Y denotes the average per period profit from being
in the “cartel state” then F = γ (Y −αμ) where γ > 0. This specification avoids
the introduction of a state variable but still allows the penalty to be sensitive to
the (average) extent of collusion. In sum, the competition policy parameters are
(σ, γ ) which are, respectively, the probability of paying penalties and the penalty
multiple.
Whenever a cartel is shut down—whether due to internal collapse or hav-
ing been successfully prosecuted—the industry may re-cartelize in the future.
Specifically, it has an opportunity to do so with probability κ in each period that
it is not currently colluding. Alternatively, one could imagine having two distinct
probabilities—one to reconstitute collusion after a firm cheated (the probability
of moving from the punishment to the cooperative phase) and another to reform
the cartel after having been convicted. For purposes of parsimony and tractability,
those two probabilities are assumed to be the same; we have no reason to think
that results are sensitive to this assumption.
The modeling of collusion here differs from how it is typically done. The
standard approach presumes that firms are always coordinating; even when they
are competing, it is a coordinated punishment in response to suspected cheating. In
a perfect monitoring setting such as Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), it may require
adjusting the collusive price so as to maintain cartel stability. Or, in an imperfect
monitoring setting, it may require periodic shifts to distinctly lower prices. But,
at all times, firms are coordinating their behavior. We do not believe that is always
a reasonable representation of reality. There are many well-documented episodes
in which a cartel truly collapses in the sense that coordination stops and what
emerges from the ashes is competition. Of course, coordination may start up
again but it need not be immediate and the prospect of it re-starting may be
reasonably viewed as uncertain from the perspective of firms.
In modeling a population of industries, it is compelling to allow industries
to vary in terms of cartel stability. For this purpose, industries are assumed to
differ in terms of the parameter η. If one takes this assumption literally, it can
be motivated by heterogeneity in the elasticity of firm demand or the number of
firms (as with the Bertrand price game). Our intent is not to be literal but rather to
think of this as a parsimonious way in which to encompass industry heterogeneity.
Let the c.d.f. on industry types be represented by the continuously differentiable
function G : [η, η¯] → [0, 1] where 1 < η < η¯. g(·) denotes the associated
density function. The appeal of having heterogeneity with respect to η is that it
is a parameter which influences the frequency of collusion but does not directly
affect the value of the firm’s profit stream since, in equilibrium, firms do not cheat;
this makes for an easier analysis. In Section 5.3, we discuss the robustness of our
results with respect to other forms of industry heterogeneity.
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3. Equilibrium Cartel Formation
Characterization of the stationary distribution on cartels is a three-step procedure.
First, the equilibrium conditions for a cartel to be stable in a type-η industry
are characterized in this section. This result is then used in the ensuing section
where the stationary distribution on the sub-population of type-η industries is first
characterized and then that result is integrated over all values of η to derive the
aggregate stationary distribution.
3.1. Existence of an Equilibrium
A collusive strategy for a type-η industry entails colluding when π is sufficiently
low and not colluding otherwise. The logic is as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).
When π is high, the incentive to deviate is strong since a firm increases current
profit by (η − 1)π . Given that π is i.i.d., the future payoff is independent of the
current realization of π . Because the payoff to cheating is increasing in π while
the future payoff is independent of π , the incentive compatibility of collusion
is more problematic when π is higher. Depending on the parameter values, it is
possible that collusion is not incentive compatible for any π ∈ [π, π¯ ], in which
case those industries never cartelize. Similarly, it may be the case that collusion
is incentive compatible for all π ∈ [π, π¯ ], in which case such cartels are never
subject to internal collapse and are only shut down by the authorities.
Suppose firms are able to collude for at least some realizations of π . Let Wo
and Yo denote the payoff when the industry is not cartelized and is cartelized,
respectively. If not cartelized then, with probability κ , firms have an opportunity to
cartelize with resulting payoffYo. With probability 1−κ , firms do not have such an
opportunity and continue to compete. In that case, each firm earns current expected
profit of αμ and a future value of Wo. Thus, the payoff when not colluding is
defined recursively by
Wo = (1 − κ)(αμ + δWo) + κY o. (1)
It will be easier to work with re-scaled payoffs, so define
W ≡ (1 − δ)Wo, Y ≡ (1 − δ)Y o.
Multiplying both sides of equation (1) by 1 − δ and re-arranging yields
W = (1 − κ)[(1 − δ)αμ + δW ] + κY,
and then solving for W yields
W = (1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ) . (2)
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Note also that the incremental value to being in the cartelized state is
Y − W = Y −
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ − κY
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)
= (1 − κ)(1 − δ)(Y − αμ)
1 − δ(1 − κ) . (3)
Suppose firms are cartelized and π is realized. The incentive compatibility
constraint (ICC) is
(1 − δ)π + δ[(1 − σ)Y + σ(W − F)] ≥ (1 − δ)ηπ + δ(W − σF),
which can be solved for π to obtain
π ≤ δ(1 − σ)(Y − W)
(1 − δ)(η − 1) ≡ ϕ(Y, η). (4)
Collusion is stable when the profit realization is sufficiently low. Given that all
other firms collude, a firm earns π by also colluding and it has an expected
continuation payoff of (1 − σ)Y + σ(W − F), since with probability σ it is
caught and convicted, in which case the industry shifts to the non-cartel state
and each firm pays a penalty of F .8 Note that the expected penalty does not
impact the ICC because it is unaffected by whether a firm cheats or colludes.
The presumption is that discovery depends only on whether firms attempted to
coordinate this period and not on whether such coordination was successful (that
is, a firm does not believe its act of cheating alters the likelihood of paying
penalties in the current period). This is clearly a simplification and indeed there
have been analyses modeling how the realized price path influences the likelihood
of detection and feeds back to impact the optimal cartel price path (Harrington
2004, 2005; Harrington and Chen 2006).
The expected (rescaled) payoff to being cartelized can now be recursively
defined. Given an industry is cartelized and given a profit realization π ≤ ϕ(Y, η),
each firm earns profit of π and the cartel is caught with probability σ in which
case each receives the future non-collusive payoff W less the penalty F ; and if
not caught each earns the future collusive value Y . If instead ϕ(Y, η) < π then
the cartel collapses so each firm earns απ and the future value is W less expected
penalties.9 The following equation then defines the implied collusive value, ψ(Y ),
when firms perceive it to be Y .
8. We will later substitute γ (Y − αμ) for F .
9. One might expect the probability of being caught to be lower if firms are not currently colluding
(though did collude in the previous period). This we consider a reasonable approximation in that the
difference in probability is likely to be small and making this assumption simplifies the analysis.
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ψ(Y ) =
∫ δ(1−σ)(Y−W)
(1−δ)(η−1)
π
[(1 − δ)π + δY − δσ (Y − W)]h(π)dπ
+
∫ π¯
δ(1−σ)(Y−W)
(1−δ)(η−1)
[(1 − δ)απ + δW ]h(π)dπ − δσF. (5)
To derive an expression in only one unknown, Y , substitute for (Y − W) using
equation (3), substitute for W using equation (2), and replace F with γ (Y −αμ):
ψ (Y ) =
∫ δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
[
(1− δ)π + δY −
(
δσ (1− κ)(1 − δ)(Y − αμ)
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
+
∫ π¯
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
[
(1 − δ)απ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
− δσγ (Y − αμ). (6)
A fixed point of ψ is an equilibrium value of Y . That is, given an anticipated
collusive value Y , the resulting equilibrium behavior results in that same value
when firms are cartelized.
As an initial step to exploring the set of fixed points, first note that ψ(αμ) =
αμ. Hence, one fixed point to ψ is the degenerate solution without collusion. It
is straightforward to show ψ(μ) ≤ μ and, if σ > 0 and γ > 0, then ψ(μ) < μ.
The issue is whether there is another fixed point, in which case Y > αμ, and thus
firms cartelize with positive probability. Theorem 1 will help us establish when
that is the case.
Theorem 1. Assume κ/(1 − δ(1 − κ)) > σγ . Then:
(i) ψ : [αμ,μ] → [αμ,μ];
(ii) ψ ′(Y ) ≥ 0 for all Y ∈ [αμ,μ);
(iii) if ϕ(Y, η) ∈ (π, π¯) then ψ ′(Y ) > 0.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Thus, if the probability of discovery and conviction, σ , and/or the penalty
multiple, γ , are sufficiently low then ψ continuously maps [αμ,μ] into itself and
is an increasing function of Y . From here on, assume
κ
1 − δ(1 − κ) > σγ.
Define Y ∗ to be the maximal fixed point of ψ ,
Y ∗(η) ≡ max{Y ∈ [αμ,μ] : ψ(Y ; η) = Y }. (7)
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A collusive solution is said to exist when Y ∗ > αμ. The next result shows that,
when the probability of having to pay penalties is sufficiently low, a cartel forms
with positive probability when η is sufficiently low. Otherwise, a cartel never
forms.
Theorem 2. If σ is sufficiently close to zero then there exists ηˆ > 1 such that
(a) Y ∗(η) ∈ (αμ,μ] if η ∈ (1, ηˆ] and (b) Y ∗(η) = αμ if η > ηˆ.
From here on, assume σ is sufficiently low and η is sufficiently close to one
so that a cartel forms for sufficiently low values of η (that is, ηˆ > η) and, in
addition, does not form for sufficiently high values of η (that is, η¯ is sufficiently
high so that ηˆ < η¯).
If there are multiple interior solutions to equation (6), we make the usual
selection that firms achieve the equilibrium with the highest value, which is Y ∗(η).
Given Y ∗(η), define ϕ∗(η) as the maximum profit realization such that the cartel
is stable,
ϕ∗(η) ≡ δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)[Y
∗(η) − αμ]
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) . (8)
ϕ∗(η) is a measure of cartel stability because the cartel is stable if and only if
π ≤ ϕ∗(η). This can be seen more clearly by noting that the probability a cartel
survives in any period is (1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(η)) which is non-decreasing in ϕ∗(η).
3.2. Comparative Statics
Theorem 3 provides some intuitive comparative statics regarding the value to
cartelizing, Y ∗(η), and the measure of cartel stability, ϕ∗(η).
Theorem 3. Y ∗(η) is non-increasing in σ , γ , and η. If Y ∗(η) ∈ (αμ,μ) then
Y ∗(η) is decreasing in σ and γ . If ϕ∗(η) ∈ (π, π¯) then Y ∗(η) is decreasing in η
and ϕ∗(η) is decreasing in σ , γ , η, and α.
When competition policy is made tougher—as reflected in a higher value
for σ or γ —the value to forming a cartel, Y ∗(η), is reduced. There is both a
direct effect and an indirect effect underlying this result. The direct effect is that
the expected penalty is higher—by making conviction more likely or increasing
the penalty multiple—and this lowers the collusive value, holding firm behavior
fixed. This higher expected penalty induces an indirect (behavioral) effect as it
reduces the range of profit realizations for which the cartel is stable (that is, ϕ∗(η)
is decreasing in σ and γ ). Therefore, firms expect a shorter duration from forming
a cartel and this also serves to reduce the collusive value. Hence, both the direct
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and indirect effects work to reduce the value to being cartelized and the stability of
the cartel. With regards to the effect of the industry type η, only the indirect effect
is operative. There is a greater payoff to cheating for an industry with a higher
value for η and this translates into a less stable cartel and a lower value to being
cartelized. A final parameter of interest is the non-collusive profit rate which
is controlled by α. As α rises, the expected incremental profit from colluding,
(1 − α)μ, is reduced, and the cartel is made less stable because the punishment
from cheating declines. A higher value for α then weakens the incentive to form
a cartel and reduces cartel stability.10
Recall from Theorem 2 that if η is sufficiently high then an industry will
not cartelize for any profit state; only industries for which η ≤ ηˆ can potentially
cartelize. The next result shows that when competition policy is tougher or the
non-collusive profit is higher, there is a smaller set of industries that are able to
cartelize. The intuition is the same as with Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. ηˆ is decreasing in σ , γ , and α.
4. Stationary Distribution on Cartels
Using the preceding analysis, the stochastic process by which cartels are born
and die (either through internal collapse or being caught) is characterized in
this section. The random events driving this process are: (i) the opportunity to
cartelize; (ii) the profit conditions; and (iii) detection by the competition author-
ity. We initially characterize the stationary distribution for the subset of type-η
industries. The stationary distribution for the entire population of industries is
then characterized by integrating the distributions for the type-η industries.
Section 3 characterized behavior for a specific industry. There it was shown
that if a type-η industry was not cartelized at the end of the previous period then
it will cartelize and collude in the current period with probability κH(ϕ∗(η)).
If a type-η industry was cartelized at the end of the previous period then it will
still be cartelized at the end of this period with probability (1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(η)).
Suppose there is a continuum of type-η industries with independent realizations
of the stochastic events each period. The task is to characterize the stationary
distribution with regards to the frequency and duration of cartels.
Let β(l; η) denote the proportion of type-η industries with cartels of length
l ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. l = 0 means firms are not cartelized so that 1 − β(0; η) is
the fraction of cartels among type-η industries. To reduce the notational burden,
10. The collusive value can be shown to be increasing in the non-collusive profit rate (which is
controlled by α) but that is not very informative because the collusive value is also based on periods
during which firms earn the non-collusive profit. More informative is that the incremental expected
gain from colluding, Y ∗(η;α)−αμ, can be shown to be decreasing in α. It is the latter property that
results in ϕ∗(η;α) being decreasing in α.
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η will often be suppressed. The stationary distribution is defined by the following
set of equations:
β(0; η) = β(0; η)[(1 − κ) + κ(1 − H(ϕ∗)) + κσH(ϕ∗)] (9)
+ [1 − β(0; η)][(1 − H(ϕ∗)) + σH(ϕ∗)],
β(1; η) = β(0; η)κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗), (10)
β(l; η) = β(l − 1; η)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗), l ∈ {2, 3, . . .}. (11)
Note that η enters through ϕ∗. Considering the right-hand side of equation (9),
fractionβ(0; η)of type-η industries were not cartelized in the previous period. Out
of those industries, a fraction 1 − κ will not have the opportunity to cartelize and
thus will not collude in the current period. A fraction κ(1 −H(ϕ∗)) will have the
opportunity but, due to a high profit realization, find it is not incentive compatible
to collude, while a fraction κσH(ϕ∗) will cartelize but then are discovered by the
authorities. Of the industries that were colluding in the previous period, which
have mass 1 − β(0; η), fraction 1 − H(ϕ∗) will collapse for internal reasons and
a fraction σH(ϕ∗) will instead be caught by the authorities and thus shut down.
Turning to equation (10), an industry can go from competing to colluding by
being presented with the opportunity to cartelize, which occurs with probability
κ , and having a sufficiently low profit realization, which occurs with probability
H(ϕ∗). Finally, an existing cartel continues to collude—which means if it is of
length l − 1 then its length grows to l—if the profit realization is sufficiently
low and it is not discovered and convicted; the joint probability of that event is
(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗) which gives us equation (11).
Solving equation (9) for β(0; η), we get
β(0; η) = 1 − (1 − σ)H(ϕ
∗)
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗) . (12)
In the steady-state, the fraction of cartels among type-η industries is then
1 − β(0; η) = κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ
∗)
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗) . (13)
Next note that
β(l; η) = β(0; η)κ[H(ϕ)(1 − σ)]l , l ≥ 1. (14)
A mass β(0; η)κ of industries get the chance to form a cartel and a fraction of
[H(ϕ)(1 − σ)]l will still be cartelized l periods later. Using equation (12), we
can substitute for β(0; η) in equation (14) and obtain
β(l; η) = [1 − (1 − σ)H(ϕ
∗)]κ[H(ϕ∗)(1 − σ)]l
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗) , l ≥ 1.
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Next define the probability distribution over cartel length among cartels,
{f (l; η)}∞l=1. For l ≥ 1,
f (l; η) ≡ β(l; η)
1 − β(0; η)
=
( [1 − (1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)]κ[H(ϕ∗)(1 − σ)]l
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)
)
×
(
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)
)−1
= [1 − (1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)][(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)]l−1
= [(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)]l−1 − [(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗)]l .
The average cartel length is then
∞∑
l=1
lf (l; η) = 1
1 − (1 − σ)H(ϕ∗) .
Finally, the derivation of the entire population of industries is performed by
integrating the type-η distribution over types, η ∈ [η, η¯]. {β˜(l)}∞l=0 denotes the
stationary distribution on cartel length, where
β˜(l) =
∫ η¯
η
β(l; η)g(η)dη, l = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Of particular relevance is the frequency with which industries are cartelized,
1 − β˜(0) =
∫ ηˆ
η
[1 − β(0; η)]g(η)dη
=
∫ ηˆ
η
[
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(η))
]
g(η)dη,
and the frequency of discovered cartels is
σ [1 − β˜(0)] = σ
∫ ηˆ
η
[
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(η))
]
g(η)dη.
5. Evaluating the Impact of Competition Policy
5.1. Introduction
In the firms’ problem, government policy enters through the penalty multiple,
γ , and the probability of detection and conviction, σ . Of relevance is that γ
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and σ represent firms’ perception of the determination of penalties (as modeled
by γ ) and the probability of paying penalties (as modeled by σ ). Thus, from the
perspective of the competition authority, γ and σ are latent parameters influenced
by policy. For example, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
may increase the amount of resources used to prosecute cartels but exactly how
this will impact the probability that firms assign to being caught and convicted
is unknown. Or the European Commission may alter the formula for calculating
penalties, as it did with the 2006 Guidelines, but how this change translates into
the perception of firms regarding the determination of penalties is unclear. In fact,
the “formula” for calculating penalties involves subjective factors—such as the
“seriousness of the offense”—and this leaves room for subjective beliefs.
The starting point to the exercises conducted in this section is that the com-
petition authority makes a policy change that has an unobserved and uncertain
impact on γ or σ . Our first task is to characterize how a change in γ or σ affects the
rate of cartel formation. With those results, a competition authority could deduce
the impact of a new policy if it knew what the new values were for the latent
parameters γ and σ . However, it is presumed not to have that information. We
then investigate whether the change in the cartel rate (caused by the unobserved
change in γ or σ ) can be inferred by examining changes in the observable pop-
ulation of discovered cartels. The questions are then as follows: (1) What is the
effect of a change in a latent policy parameter on the number of cartels? (2) Can
the effect on the number of cartels be inferred from the change in the population
of discovered cartels?
5.2. Main Results
When penalties for collusion are increased, Theorem 5 reports that there are both
fewer cartels and fewer discovered cartels, as reflected in the stationary distri-
bution. This is not surprising because more severe penalties result in less stable
cartels—as ϕ∗(η) is decreasing in γ by Theorem 3—which means that a given
industry is in the cartelized state a smaller fraction of the time. Furthermore, by
Theorem 4, ηˆ is decreasing in γ which means that a smaller fraction of industries
are ever able to cartelize.
Theorem 5. The rate of cartel formation, 1 − β˜(0), and the rate of discovered
cartels, σ [1 − β˜(0)], are decreasing in the severity of penalties, γ .
Let us now use these results to infer the impact of a new policy on the unob-
served rate of cartels by observing the rate of discovered cartels. (This exercise is
straightforward but we go through it in preparation for a later discussion.) Suppose
there is a change in the penalty policy which, unbeknownst to the competition
authority, results in a change in γ from γ ′ to γ ′′. If γ ′′ > γ ′ then the policy has
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intensified penalties (as perceived by firms) in which case the cartel rate falls.
Or the policy might have had some perverse consequences so that γ ′′ < γ ′ and
the cartel rate rises.11 Or perhaps the policy change is totally ineffective so that
γ ′′ = γ ′. This may arise if the maximum penalty is increased but proves not to
affect expected penalties.
To infer the policy impact on the cartel rate from the discovered cartel rate,
consider the ratio of the new to the old steady-state discovered cartel rate,
σ [1 − β˜(0; γ ′′)]
σ [1 − β˜(0; γ ′)] =
1 − β˜(0; γ ′′)
1 − β˜(0; γ ′) .
In response to a change in the penalty parameter, the percentage change in the
cartel rate equals the percentage change in the discovered cartel rate so the latter
can be used to infer the former. Thus, if there are fewer discovered cartels after
the policy change, one can infer that there are fewer cartels.
Next consider the effect of a policy change that is designed to affect the
probability of discovery and conviction. Although a tougher enforcement policy
that is efficacious—as reflected in a higher value for σ—reduces the cartel rate,
its impact on the rate of discovered cartels is ambiguous.
Theorem 6. The rate of cartel formation, 1 − β˜(0), is decreasing in σ but the
effect of σ on the rate of discovered cartels, σ [1 − β˜(0)], is ambiguous (that is,
its sign depends on parameter values).
To understand why σ has an ambiguous effect on the rate of discovered
cartels, consider raising σ from σ ′ to σ ′′. The change in the rate of discovered
cartels equals
σ ′′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η, σ ′′)]g(η)dη − σ ′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η, σ ′)]g(η)dη.
This can be re-arranged so that the frequency of discovered cartels goes up if and
only if
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[σ ′′(1 − β(0; η, σ ′′)) − σ ′(1 − β(0; η, σ ′))]g(η)dη
> σ ′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
ηˆ(σ ′′)
[1 − β(0; η, σ ′)]g(η)dη. (15)
11. Cyrenne (1999), Spagnolo (2000), Harrington (2004), and Chen and Harrington (2007) show
how antitrust policy can have the perverse effect of making collusion more stable.
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The right-hand side term is the reduction in discovered cartels because the
marginally stable cartels no longer form (or, if they did form, they now col-
lapse) and thus are not there to be caught. The left-hand side is the change in the
rate of discovered cartels among those cartels that continue to form in spite of the
higher chance of paying penalties.
Depending on σ ′ and σ ′′, equation (15) could either hold or not hold so
that a rise in the probability of detection could either raise or lower the number of
discovered cartels. If the initial probability of detection, σ ′, is sufficiently low then
few cartels are being discovered and thus an increase toσ ′′ means more discovered
cartels. In contrast, if σ ′ is close to one then the reduced cartel rate from raising
σ dominates the higher discovery rate so that there are fewer discovered cartels
(details are in the proof of Theorem 6).
It is then problematic inferring the effect of a policy change on the latent
cartel rate by measuring what has happened to the observed rate of discovered
cartels. For example, a rise in the rate of discovered cartels is consistent with both
the probability of detection having increased (and thus there are fewer cartels)
and having decreased (and thus there are more cartels). However, as shown sub-
sequently, one can derive an observable and unambiguous implication of a more
effective detection policy by examining changes in the duration of discovered
cartels.
The stationary distribution on cartel length, conditional on being cartelized
(l ≥ 1), is
f˜ (l) ≡
∫ ηˆ
η
β(l; η)g(η)dη
∫ ηˆ
η
[1 − β(0; η)]g(η)dη
.
Perform the following steps:
f˜ (l) =
∫ ηˆ(σ )
η
⎡
⎣ β(l; η)g(η)dη∫ ηˆ(σ )
η
[1 − β(0; η′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦
=
∫ ηˆ(σ )
η
(
β(l; η, σ )
1 − β(0; η, σ )
)⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ )
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ )]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
=
∫ ηˆ(σ )
η
f (l; η)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ )
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ )]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη.
f˜ (l) is then a weighted average of f (l; η), where the weight assigned to f (l; η)
is the fraction of all cartels that are of type η.
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In considering the impact of raising σ from σ ′ to σ ′′ on {f˜ (l)}∞l=1, let us break
it apart into short-run and long-run effects. The short-run effect on the distribution
over the duration of discovered cartels is from the immediate collapse of some
cartels upon the institution of a more aggressive detection and conviction policy.
The long-run effect is the change in the distribution on duration as it converges
to the new stationary distribution. This can be made more concrete. Because ηˆ is
decreasing in σ , cartels for which η ∈ (ηˆ(σ ′′), ηˆ(σ ′)] are no longer stable (for
any profit realizations) after σ is raised and thereby immediately collapse. Thus,
the policy change induces an immediate shift in the mass of cartels from
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η, σ ′)]g(η)dη
to
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η, σ ′)]g(η)dη.
The distribution on discovered (and, for that matter, undiscovered) cartel duration
shifts, in the short run, from
f˜ (l; σ ′) ≡
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
to
f¯ (l; σ ′, σ ′′) ≡
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη.
Notice that the relative weight on f (l; η, σ ′), for η ∈ [η, ηˆ(σ ′′)], is unchanged.
Theorem 7. If σ ′′ > σ ′ then f¯ (l; σ ′, σ ′′) first-order stochastically dominates
(FOSD) f˜ (l; σ ′). In other words, if a more aggressive detection and conviction
policy has been effective then the duration of discovered cartels increases (in
terms of FOSD) in the short run.
To summarize, a rise in σ causes the immediate collapse of the least stable
cartels (due to ηˆ being decreasing in σ). This means the surviving cartels are
those with lower η and thus longer duration. Because this is the pool from which
one draws discovered cartels, the average duration of discovered cartels rises in
the short run in response to a more aggressive detection and conviction policy.
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The transition from the short run to the (new) long run involves the distribution
on cartel length shifting from
f¯ (l; σ ′, σ ′′) =
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
to
f˜ (l; σ ′′) =
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη.
The latter is the stationary distribution on cartel duration when σ = σ ′′.
Theorem 8. If σ ′′ > σ ′ then f¯ (l; σ ′, σ ′′) FOSD f˜ (l; σ ′′). In words, if a more
aggressive detection and conviction policy has been effective then the duration
of discovered cartels decreases (in terms of FOSD) as the industry goes from the
short run to the long run.
In response to a policy that alters the likelihood of detection and conviction, its
effect on the rate of cartels can be inferred by observing the duration of discovered
cartels in the short run. If average cartel duration goes up (down) then the policy
has caused σ to rise (fall) and thus we can conclude that it will result in fewer
(more) cartels forming in the new steady state.
5.3. Robustness
Let us explore robustness of the result that cartel duration rises in the short run
in response to an increase in the probability of detection. The proof of that result
relies on three steps. First, for a given competition policy, there is a cut-off ηˆ
such that industries are capable of colluding if and only if η ∈ [η, ηˆ]. Second,
a more stringent competition policy (specifically, a higher value for σ ) causes
ηˆ to decline so that fewer industries are capable of sustaining a cartel. Third,
the expected cartel duration is decreasing in η, which has the implication that
the surviving cartels—after competition policy is made tougher—have longer
duration. The cut-off property in the first step is due to the incremental value
to colluding being decreasing in η. What is then essential is that when η rises,
both the incremental value to colluding and the expected cartel duration decline.
Thus, in response to a tougher competition policy, it is the cartels with relatively
high values for η which collapse—as the incremental value to colluding was
close enough to zero that it is now negative—and, in addition, those cartels have
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relatively short duration. In discussing other sources of heterogeneity, we will
then explore the generality of the property that the incremental value to collusion
and the expected cartel duration are positively correlated.
Suppose the source of industry heterogeneity is the discount factor, δ, rather
than the gains to price undercutting, η. An industry with more patient firms will
obviously find it easier to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints associated
with collusion. This implies that cartel duration is longer for an industry with
higher δ, as it now takes a higher profit shock to destabilize the cartel. And
because firms can expect to collude for a longer time once having cartelized,
the incremental value to collusion is higher. Hence, there’ll be some threshold
industry type, denoted δˆ, such that a cartel is capable of forming if and only
if δ > δˆ. And when competition policy is made tougher, δˆ will rise so that
cartels with relatively low values of δ will collapse and those are also the cartels
with relatively short duration. Again, we find that the surviving cartels tend to
have longer duration, which implies the average duration of discovered cartels
goes up.
Now suppose industry heterogeneity is in terms of the non-collusive solution,
α. As noted in footnote 10, the incremental value to collusion is decreasing in α;
if the non-collusive solution is less competitive, it is less valuable to collude. In
Theorem 3, it is proven that ϕ∗ is decreasing in α and, because a lower value for ϕ∗
means a higher probability of cartel shutdown (as the cartel collapses whenever
the realized profit shock is less than ϕ∗), expected cartel duration is decreasing in
α. Again, we find that those industries with lower incremental value to colluding
have lower expected cartel duration.
It may be possible to construct other forms of heterogeneity whereby the
incremental value to collusion and expected cartel duration are not positively cor-
related. For example, suppose industries differ in two dimensions: the profitability
of the non-collusive outcome (which is controlled by α) and the variability of the
profit shock, which we will denote σ 2π .12 A higher value for σ 2π will tend to mean
shorter cartel duration because it becomes more likely there will be a sufficiently
high profit shock to cause the cartel to collapse. Now suppose α and σ 2π are nega-
tively correlated so that industries which are not as competitive tend to have less
variable profit shocks. It may then be the case that industries with lower incremen-
tal value to collusion (higher α) have higher expected cartel duration (because σ 2π
is lower). Hence, the more marginal cartels that shut down in response to a tougher
competition policy may actually have higher cartel duration which means that the
surviving cartels have lower duration and thus the average duration of discovered
cartels will fall in response to a tougher competition policy. Though it does then
appear there are forms of industry heterogeneity which could reverse the result,
they are not likely to be common. And even in this carefully constructed case,
12. This example is due to the insightful comment of a referee.
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the result may not be reversed because longer average cartel duration, in and of
itself, tends to raise the incremental value to collusion.
Rather than change the source of heterogeneity, another type of change is to
allow an industry’s profit state, π , to be persistent, rather than i.i.d., over time.
Consider the extreme case in which profit is perfectly persistent but varies across
industries.13 A cartel, once formed, will persist until it is discovered because
there is no internal collapse since profit conditions do not change. It follows that
the expected cartel duration is the same for all industry types which means that
cartel duration is independent of competition policy (though the frequency of
cartel formation is not). By a continuity argument, it would seem that the main
result—cartel duration rises in the short run in response to an increase in σ—is
weaker when profits are more persistent. Nevertheless, as long as profits are not
too persistent, the result should hold though clearly the analysis would be more
complex when there is the additional state variable in the form of the current profit
state.
5.4. Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program
The previous analysis explored the impact of increasing penalties or making
detection more likely. However, the most significant policy innovation in recent
decades is the institution of a corporate leniency program, which brings forth a
constellation of effects; some of which deter cartel formation (by making dis-
covery more likely) and some of which encourage cartel formation (by waiving
penalties). Here, we briefly review some results relevant to evaluating the efficacy
of a leniency program. Using numerical analysis upon an expanded version of
our model, we find—consistent with our earlier results—that a short-run rise in
the average duration of discovered cartels indicates that a leniency program is
working.14
In modeling a leniency program, we have taken a standard approach in the
literature (see Spagnolo 2008). If a single cartel member applies for leniency
then the cartel is convicted for sure and the firm that applied receives a per period
penalty of θF where θ ∈ [0, 1], whereas the other cartel members each pay F .
As before, F = γ (Y − αμ). Thus, a proportion 1 − θ of fines are waived for
the firm that comes forward. If all firms simultaneously apply for leniency then
each firm pays a penalty of ωF , where ω ∈ (θ, 1). For example, if only one firm
can receive leniency and each firm has an equal probability of being first in the
door then ω = (n − 1 + θ)/n when there are n cartel members. It is without
13. We thank a referee for making this insightful observation.
14. Details as to the model and the numerical analysis are provided in a supplemental appendix
available from the authors.
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loss of generality that we only specify the leniency program when either one firm
applies or all firms apply. Also, leniency is not awarded to firms that apply after
another firm has done so, though the model could easily be adapted to allow for
that modification.
There are various ways in which a leniency program affects the calculus to
form and maintain a cartel.15 As described in Harrington (2008), the introduction
of a leniency program can have three effects and these three effects are operative
in our model. First, it can make cartels less stable (that is, the maximum profit
state for cartel stability is lower) because a firm that cheats can, at the same
time, apply for leniency and thus receive a higher payoff. Second, the probability
of paying penalties is higher because firms in a collapsing cartel will find it
optimal to apply for leniency. Specifically, the probability of discovery rises from
σ to σH(ϕ∗) + (1 − H(ϕ∗)), where 1 − H(ϕ∗) is the probability that a cartel
collapses. Third, a leniency program affects the penalties that cartel members
actually pay. When firms apply for leniency (which occurs in equilibrium when
the cartel collapses), penalties are reduced from F to ωF . That effect actually
serves to promote cartel formation. The introduction of a leniency program then
has countervailing effects which makes a formal investigation worthwhile.
For all of the parameterizations of the model that we considered, a leniency
program was found to be effective in reducing cartel formation.
Property 1. The introduction of a corporate leniency program reduces the
long-run frequency of cartels and raises the rate at which cartels are discovered.
Of course, the population of cartels is not observed and thus those predictions
cannot be tested directly. How the latent policy parameters θ and ω influence the
observable population of discovered cartels is summarized as Property 2. If in fact
the leniency program is affecting cartel behavior as described in Property 1 then,
in the short run, the duration of discovered cartels will rise. However, contrary to
Theorem 8, the long-run effect on average observed cartel duration could go up
or down.
Property 2. In the short run, the introduction of a corporate leniency program
raises the average duration of discovered cartels. In the long run, the average
duration of discovered cartels can go up or down.
6. Concluding Remarks
In the last 15 years, major policy changes in the manner in which cartels are
discovered, prosecuted, and penalized have occurred in the European Union,
15. The ensuing discussion presumes leniency is sufficiently great (specifically, θ < σ) so that it
would be used by a cartel member.
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United States, and many other countries in the world. Though there are various
intermediate measures of the impact of these policies—most notably the number
of convictions, the number of leniency applications, and the penalties imposed—
the true measure of interest is the number of cartels in existence. Success and
failure of a policy is ultimately decided by the extent to which cartels are deterred
from forming. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to develop a method
for inferring the impact of policy on the latent cartel rate using the observed
population of discovered cartels.
The efficacy of a policy that is intended to increase the severity of penalties
can be measured by observing the change in the number of discovered cartels as
it serves as a useful proxy for the number of cartels. That is not the case, however,
with policies that affect the probability of discovery and prosecution or with the
introduction of a leniency program. Our main finding is that if these policies have,
in fact, been effective in reducing the rate of cartel formation then we ought to
observe a short-run increase in the duration of discovered cartels. The duration
of discovered cartels can then provide some information as to what is happening
with the underlying rate of cartelization in the economy. Though the results are
admittedly tentative in light of the simplicity of our model, it does show that
theory can shed light on the impact of policy innovations and inject some needed
substance into the policy debate.
There are many possible extensions of this framework. In markets lacking
significant entry barriers, an important constraint on collusion is the prospect
of either entry or expansion by small non-cartel members. Though the threat of
entry was not a constraint for most of the markets controlled by the vitamins
cartel, it was in the case of vitamin C where expansion by Chinese suppli-
ers eventually disrupted collusion. One extension of our framework is to allow
for industry heterogeneity with respect to entry barriers and then endogenize
the effect of cartel formation on the number of firms. Another extension is to
endogenize the probability of detection and prosecution by assuming that the
authority is constrained in how many cartels it can discover and cases it can
handle.
Currently, there is an active policy debate in many countries as to the design of
anti-cartel policies. It is absolutely vital that economists play a role in that debate
in order to ensure that sound policies are implemented and those policies that
are implemented are properly evaluated as to their impact. This is an admittedly
difficult exercise but the alternative is to allow the debate to be dominated by casual
and potentially misleading measures such as the number of convictions. Indeed,
one would hope that a highly successful policy would ultimately be measured by
the absence of convictions because few cartels are forming. But then we’re always
left with distinguishing such an absence from simply an ineffective policy; that
is, there are still plenty of cartels, we’re just not catching and convicting them. It
is the importance of making that distinction that motivates this line of work and
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it is our hope that this paper will encourage others to venture into this arena and
make more progress on this important economic and policy issue.
Appendix: Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that
ψ(Y ) =
∫ ϕ(Y )
π
[(1 − δ)π + δY − δσ (Y − W)]h(π)dπ
+
∫ π¯
ϕ(Y )
[(1 − δ)απ + δW ]h(π)dπ − δσF,
where
ϕ(Y ) = δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y − αμ)[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) ,
W = (1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ) ,
F = γ (Y − αμ).
Because Y ≥ W ,
ψ(μ) ≤
∫ ϕ(μ)
π
[(1 − δ)π + δμ]h(π)dπ
+
∫ π¯
ϕ(μ)
[(1 − δ)απ + δμ]h(π)dπ − δσF
= μ −
∫ π¯
ϕ(μ)
(1 − δ)(1 − α)πh(π)dπ − δσF,
and, therefore, ψ(μ) < μ. Given that ψ(αμ) = αμ, it follows that ψ maps
[αμ,μ] into itself as long as ψ ′(Y ) ≥ 0 for all Y—which we now show to hold.
If ϕ(Y ) < π then
ψ(Y ) =
∫ π¯
π
[(1 − δ)απ + δW ]h(π)dπ − δσF,
and thus
ψ ′(Y ) =
∫ π¯
π
δ
∂W
∂Y
h(π)dπ = δκ
1 − δ(1 − κ) > 0.
1422 Journal of the European Economic Association
If π¯ < ϕ(Y ) then
ψ(Y ) =
∫ π¯
π
[(1 − δ)π + δY − δσ (Y − W)]h(π)dπ − δσγ (Y − αμ),
and thus
ψ ′(Y )= δ
[
1− σ
(
1− ∂W
∂Y
)
− σ ∂F
∂Y
]
= δ
[
(1 − σ)
(
1 − ∂W
∂Y
)
+ ∂W
∂Y
− σγ
]
,
which is positive because ∂W/∂Y = κ/(1 − δ(1 − κ)) ∈ (0, 1) and it is assumed
κ/(1 − δ(1 − κ)) > σγ .
If we now suppose ϕ(Y ) ∈ (π, π¯), then
ψ ′(Y ) = [(1 − δ)ϕ(Y ) + δY − δσ (Y − W)]h(ϕ(Y ))ϕ′(Y )
+
∫ ϕ(Y )
π
δ
[
1 − σ
(
1 − ∂W
∂Y
)]
h(π)dπ
− [(1 − δ)αϕ(Y ) + δW ]h(ϕ(Y ))ϕ′(Y ) +
∫ π¯
ϕ(Y )
δ
∂W
∂Y
h(π)dπ − δσ ∂F
∂Y
= [(1 − δ)(1 − α)ϕ(Y ) + δ(1 − σ)(Y − W)]h(ϕ(Y ))ϕ′(Y )
+
∫ ϕ(Y )
π
δ(1 − σ)
(
1 − ∂W
∂Y
)
h(π)dπ + δ
(
∂W
∂Y
− σ ∂F
∂Y
)
,
which is positive because ∂W/∂Y ∈ (0, 1) and
∂W
∂Y
− σ ∂F
∂Y
= κ
1 − δ(1 − κ) − σγ > 0.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Let us first prove that a collusive solution exists for η close to 1. First note that if
Y − αμ > 0 then
lim
η→1
δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) = +∞.
Hence, limη→1 ϕ(Y, η) > π¯ , which implies
lim
η→1 ψ(Y ) =
∫ π¯
π
[
(1− δ)π + δY −
(
δσ (1− κ)(1− δ)(Y − αμ)
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
− δσγ (Y − αμ).
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Next note that
lim
σ→0 limη→1 ψ(Y ) =
∫ π¯
π
[(1 − δ)π + δY ]h(π)dπ,
where the order of limits does not matter. Recall that (1 − δ)μ + δY > Y if and
only if Y < μ; therefore, if Y ∈ (αμ,μ), then limσ→0 limη→1 ψ(Y ) > Y . Thus,
if Y < μ then ψ(Y ) > Y for η sufficiently close to one and σ sufficiently close
to zero. By continuity, there exists Y ∈ (αμ,μ] such that ψ(Y ) = Y . We then
have the following conclusion: If σ is sufficiently close to zero then there exists
ηˆ > 1 such that Y ∗(η) ∈ (αμ,μ] for all η ∈ (1, ηˆ].
The next step is to prove that a collusive solution does not exist for large
enough η. We want to show that ψ(Y ) < Y for all Y > αμ when η → +∞. The
ICC is
(1 − δ)π + δ(1 − σ)Y + δσ (W − F) ≥ (1 − δ)ηπ + δW − δσF,
which is equivalent to
δ(1 − σ)(Y − W) ≥ (1 − δ)(η − 1)π, (A.1)
where the left-hand side is increasing in Y and decreasing in W and the right-hand
side is increasing π . Because (a) π ≥ π (> 0), (b) W ≥ αμ, and (c) Y ≤ μ, the
following is a sufficient condition for equation (A.1) not to hold for all π :
δ(1 − σ)(1 − α)μ < (1 − δ)(η − 1)π,
which is equivalent to
(1 − δ)π + δ(1 − σ)(1 − α)μ
(1 − δ)π < η.
Thus, there exists η′ such that a cartel never forms when η > η′.
To sum, there exists ηˆ > 1 such that Y ∗(η) ∈ (αμ,μ] for all η ∈ (1, ηˆ]
and there exists η′ > ηˆ such that ψ(Y ; η) < Y for all Y > αμ and all η > η′.
Therefore, Y ∗(η) = αμ for all η > η′. It is shown in the proof of Theorem
3 that ψ(Y ) is decreasing in η. Hence, if ψ(Y ; η′′) < Y for all Y > αμ then
ψ(Y ; η) < Y for all Y > αμ and all η > η′′. We conclude that there is ηˆ > 1
such that Y ∗(η) ∈ (αμ,μ] for all η ∈ (1, ηˆ] and Y ∗(η) = αμ for all η > ηˆ.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
If Y ∗(η) ∈ {αμ,μ} then the maximal fixed point is a corner solution, in which
case, generically, marginal changes in parameters do not affect Y ∗(η). For the
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remainder of the proof suppose Y ∗(η) ∈ (αμ,μ). Furthermore, assume initially
that ϕ ∈ (π, π¯).
To explore the effect of σ on Y ∗(η), consider
∂ψ(Y )
∂σ
= [(1 − δ)ϕ + δY − δσ (Y − W)]h(ϕ) ∂ϕ
∂σ
−
∫ ϕ
π
δ(Y − W)h(π)dπ − [(1 − δ)αϕ + δW ]h(ϕ) ∂ϕ
∂σ
− δF
= [(1 − δ)(1 − α)ϕ + δ(1 − σ)(Y − W)]h(ϕ) ∂ϕ
∂σ
−
∫ ϕ
π
δ(Y − W)h(π)dπ − δF,
which is negative because
∂ϕ
∂σ
= −δ(1 − κ)(Y − αμ)[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) < 0.
Now consider increasing σ from σ ′ to σ ′′. Given that ∂ψ(Y )/∂σ < 0, ψ(Y )
shifts down. Because ψ(Y, σ ′) ≤ Y as Y ≥ Y ∗(σ ′), we have ψ(Y, σ ′′) < Y for
all Y ≥ Y ∗(σ ′); this implies Y ∗(σ ′′) < Y ∗(σ ′). The other comparative statics
on Y ∗ will also use this method of showing how a change in a parameter affects
ψ(Y ).
Next consider changing γ. Because
∂ψ(Y )
∂γ
= −δσ (Y − αμ) < 0,
ψ(Y ) is also decreasing in γ ; this implies that Y ∗ is decreasing in γ.
If instead ϕ = π then Y ∗(η) = αμ and thus Y ∗(η) is, generically,
independent of σ and γ. If ϕ = π¯ then
ψ(Y ) =
∫ π¯
π
[(1 − δ)π + δY − δσ (Y − W)]h(π)dπ − δσF
=
∫ π¯
π
[
(1 − δ)π + δY − δσ (1 − κ)(1 − δ)(Y − αμ)
1 − δ(1 − κ)
]
h(π)dπ
− δσγ (Y − αμ),
which is decreasing in σ and γ and, therefore, Y ∗ is decreasing in σ and γ .
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Now consider the impact of changing η. Note that η only operates through ϕ
since, in equilibrium, a firm never cheats. Hence, Y ∗(η) is independent of η when
ϕ /∈ (π, π¯). Let us then suppose ϕ ∈ (π, π¯), in which case
∂ψ(Y )
∂η
= [(1 − δ)ϕ + δY − δσ (Y − W)]h(ϕ)∂ϕ
∂η
− [(1 − δ)αϕ + δW ]h(ϕ)∂ϕ
∂η
= [(1 − δ)(1 − α)ϕ + δ(1 − σ)(Y − W)]h(ϕ)∂ϕ
∂η
,
which is negative because
∂ϕ
∂η
= −δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y − αμ)[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1)2 .
Hence, raising η lowers ψ(Y ) and thus lowers Y ∗.
Turning to comparative statics for ϕ∗, first note that if ϕ∗ > π then Y ∗ > αμ
and
ϕ∗ = δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y
∗ − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) .
We will consider successively how ϕ∗ depends on σ , on γ , and on η—each
time denoting as the argument of ϕ∗ and Y ∗ the variable with respect to which
comparative statics are being performed.
For σ ′′ > σ ′, ϕ∗(σ ′′) − ϕ∗(σ ′) is equal to
δ(1 − σ ′′)(1 − κ)(Y ∗(σ ′′) − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) −
δ(1 − σ ′)(1 − κ)(Y ∗(σ ′) − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1)
=
(
δ(1 − κ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1)
)
× [(1 − σ ′′)(Y ∗(σ ′′) − αμ) − (1 − σ ′)(Y ∗(σ ′) − αμ)],
which is negative. Thus, ϕ∗ is decreasing in σ .
For γ ′′ > γ ′, ϕ∗(γ ′′) − ϕ∗(γ ′) is equal to
δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y ∗(γ ′′) − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) −
δ(1 − σ ′)(1 − κ)(Y ∗(γ ′) − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1)
=
(
δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1)
)
[Y ∗(γ ′′) − Y ∗(γ ′)] < 0,
because, by Theorem 3, Y ∗ is decreasing in γ . Thus, ϕ∗ is decreasing in γ.
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For η′′ > η′, ϕ∗(η′′) − ϕ∗(η′) is equal to
δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y ∗(η′′) − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η′′ − 1) −
δ(1 − σ ′)(1 − κ)(Y ∗(η′) − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η′ − 1)
=
(
δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)]
)[(
Y ∗(η′′) − αμ
η′′ − 1
)
−
(
Y ∗(η′) − αμ
η′ − 1
)]
< 0,
because (a) Y ∗ is decreasing in η (by Theorem 3), (b) Y ∗(η′) − αμ > Y ∗(η′′) −
αμ > 0, and (c) η′′ − 1 > η′ − 1. Thus, ϕ∗ is decreasing in η.
Finally, let us show that ϕ∗ is decreasing in α when ϕ∗ ∈ (π, π¯). Recall that
a fixed point is defined by
Y =
∫ ϕ(Y )
π
[
(1 − δ)π + δY −
(
δσ (1 − κ)(1 − δ)(Y − αμ)
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π) dπ
+
∫ π¯
ϕ(Y )
[
(1 − δ)απ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
− δσγ (Y − αμ),
where
ϕ(Y ) = δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y − αμ)[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) .
Subtract αμ from both sides and define  ≡ Y −αμ, so that we now are looking
for a fixed point in  of  = (, α), where
(, α) ≡
∫ ϕ()
π
[
(1 − δ)π + δ + δαμ −
(
δσ (1 − κ)(1 − δ)
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π) dπ
+
∫ π¯
ϕ()
[
(1 − δ)απ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κ
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)
+ δκαμ
1 − δ(1 − κ)
]
h(π)dπ − δσγ − αμ
=
∫ ϕ()
π
[
(1 − δ)π + δ −
(
δσ (1 − κ)(1 − δ)
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
+
∫ ϕ()
π
δαμh(π)dπ +
∫ π¯
ϕ()
(
δκαμ
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)
h(π)dπ
+
∫ π¯
ϕ()
[
(1 − δ)απ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κ
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
− δσγ − αμ.
Harrington and Chang Birth and Death of Cartels 1427
Note that ϕ, when written as a function of , does not depend directly
on α.
Let α = α′ and suppose ϕ∗(η;α′) ∈ (π, π¯) which implies that the maximal
fixed point, ∗(α′), is interior and thus (, α′) ≤ 0 as  ≥ ∗(α′). If we then
show that(, α) is decreasing inα, it follows that ifα′′ > α′ then(, α′′) < 0
for all  ≥ ∗(α′), and therefore ∗(α′′) < ∗(α′).
If ϕ∗(η;α′) ∈ (π, π¯) then
∂(, α)
∂α
=
∫ ϕ()
π
δμh(π)dπ +
∫ π¯
ϕ()
(
δκμ
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)
h(π)dπ
+
∫ π¯
ϕ()
[
(1 − δ)π + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)μ
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ − μ
= −
∫ ϕ()
π
(1 − δ)πh(π)dπ < 0.
We conclude that if ϕ∗(η;α′) ∈ (π, π¯) then ∗(α′) is (locally) decreasing in α.
Next note that
ϕ∗(η;α) = δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)[Y
∗(η;α) − αμ]
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) =
δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)∗(α)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) .
Hence, ϕ∗(η;α) is decreasing in α because ∗(α) is decreasing in α.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that ηˆ satisfies the property,
Y ∗(η) > αμ if η ∈ [η, ηˆ],
Y ∗(η) = αμ if η > ηˆ.
By the continuity of ψ(Y, η) with respect to Y and η and because ψ(Y, η) is
decreasing in η (when Y ∗(η) > αμ), it follows that ψ(Y, ηˆ) ≤ Y for all Y and
ψ(Y ∗(ηˆ), ηˆ) = Y ∗(ηˆ). With this property, let us now argue that ηˆ is decreasing
in σ and γ .
Consider raising σ from σ ′ to σ ′′. Because ψ(Y, η) is decreasing in σ for
Y > αμ and because ψ(Y, ηˆ(σ ′), σ ′) ≤ Y for all Y , we have ψ(Y, ηˆ(σ ′), σ ′′) <
Y for all Y > αμ. Given that ψ(Y, η) is decreasing in η for Y > αμ, we have
ηˆ(σ ′′) < ηˆ(σ ′). A similar argument applies to changes in γ .
To show that ηˆ is decreasing in α, recall from the definition of ηˆ(α) that
(, ηˆ(α), α) ≤  for all . Because (, ηˆ(α), α) is decreasing in α (holding
ηˆ fixed), the following holds: if α′′ > α′ then (, ηˆ(α′), α′′) <  for all
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 > 0. This implies ηˆ(α′′) < ηˆ(α′) if (, ηˆ(α′), α′′) is decreasing in η.
Because (, η, α) = ψ(Y, η, α)−αμ and we’ve already shown that ψ(Y, η, α)
is decreasing in η, we have (, η, α) decreasing in η.
A.5. Proof of Theorem 5
Let us first consider the impact of γ on the stationary rate of cartels for a type-η
sub-population. Suppose that penalties are made more severe as reflected in γ
being increased from γ ′ to γ ′′. As the cartel rate is
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ, η)) ,
the change in the cartel rate is
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′′, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′′, η)) −
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′, η)) .
Next note that
sign
{
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′′, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′′, η)) −
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ ′, η))
}
= sign{κ(1 − σ)[H(ϕ∗(γ ′′, η)) − H(ϕ∗(γ ′, η))]} < 0,
because ϕ∗(γ ′′) < ϕ∗(γ ′) by Theorem 3.
It is then straightforward to extend this to the entire population of cartels.
Recall that the cartel rate is∫ ηˆ(γ )
η
[
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(γ, η))
]
g(η)dη
after integrating over all type-η industries. It has just been shown that the integrand
is decreasing in γ and because ηˆ(γ ) is decreasing in γ by Theorem 4 then this
expression is decreasing inγ . Because the rate of discovered cartels is proportional
to the rate of cartels then the discovered cartel rate is also decreasing in γ .
A.6. Proof of Theorem 6
Suppose conviction is made more likely so that σ is raised from σ ′ to σ ′′. Using
equation (13), the change in the rate of cartels is
κ(1 − σ ′′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′′, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ ′′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′′, η)) −
κ(1 − σ ′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ ′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′, η)) .
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The sign of that expression is the same as
sign
{
κ(1 − σ ′′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′′, η))[1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ ′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′, η))]
−κ(1 − σ ′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′, η))[1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ ′′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′′, η))]}
= sign {(1 − σ ′′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′′, η)) − (1 − σ ′)H(ϕ∗(σ ′, η))} < 0.
This expression is negative because σ ′′ > σ ′ implies 1 − σ ′′ < 1 − σ ′ and
H(ϕ∗(σ ′′, η)) < H(ϕ∗(σ ′, η)), since ϕ∗(σ ′′, η) < ϕ∗(σ ′, η) by Theorem 3.
It is then straightforward to extend this to the entire population of cartels.
Recall that the cartel rate is
∫ ηˆ(σ )
η
[
κ(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(σ, η))
1 − (1 − κ)(1 − σ)H(ϕ∗(σ, η))
]
dG(η)
after integrating over all type-η industries. It has just been shown that the integrand
is decreasing in σ and since ηˆ(σ ) is decreasing in σ by Theorem 4 then this
expression is decreasing in σ .
To show that the rate of discovered cartels can be either increasing or decreas-
ing in σ , let us fix σ ′′(> 0) and make the initial probability of conviction
sufficiently small (σ ′ 
 0). As σ ′ → 0, equation (15) holds because the right-
hand side goes to zero and the left-hand side is bounded above zero. Not
surprisingly, the frequency of discovered cartels rises when the probability of
conviction is raised from an initial level close to zero. Now suppose instead σ ′
is sufficiently small so that some cartels form; that is, ηˆ(σ ′) > η. Consider what
happens when σ ′′ goes to one. Recall that ψ(Y ) is equal to
∫ δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
[
(1 − δ)π + δY −
(
δσ (1 − κ)(1 − δ)(Y − αμ)
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
+
∫ π¯
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
[
(1 − δ)απ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
− δσγ (Y − αμ).
For Y − αμ > 0,
lim
σ→1
δ(1 − σ)(1 − κ)(Y − αμ)
[1 − δ(1 − κ)](η − 1) = 0,
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which implies
lim
σ→1 ψ(Y ) =
∫ π¯
π
[
(1 − δ)απ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)]
h(π)dπ
− δγ (Y − αμ)
= (1 − δ)αμ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)
− δγ (Y − αμ).
If γ = 0 then
lim
σ→1 ψ(Y ) = (1 − δ)αμ + δ
(
(1 − κ)(1 − δ)αμ + κY
1 − δ(1 − κ)
)
= (1 − δ)αμ + δκY
1 − δ(1 − κ) ∈ (αμ, Y ).
Because ψ(Y ) is decreasing in γ , if Y > αμ then limσ→1 ψ(Y ) < Y . This
implies Y ∗(η) = αμ for all η > 1 as σ → 1. Hence, limσ→1 ηˆ(σ ) = 1 so the
cartel rate is zero when σ ′′ is sufficiently close to one. Because β(0; η, σ ′′) = 1
for all η > 1, equation (15) does not hold since the right-hand side is positive and
the left-hand side is zero.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 7
To prove Theorem 7, the next lemma will be useful. It shows for a type-η sub-
population that a fall in σ (and γ ) causes a first-order stochastic dominance shift
in the distribution over the length of cartels and discovered cartels.
Lemma 1. A decrease in σ or γ causes a first-order stochastic dominance
(FOSD) shift in the stationary type-η distribution on the duration of cartels and
the duration of discovered cartels.
Proof. Supposeσ is raised fromσ ′ toσ ′′ and consider the impact of the proportion
of cartels of length l.
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′) =
H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))l−1(1 − σ ′′)l−1[1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)]
H(ϕ∗(σ ′))l−1(1 − σ ′)l−1[1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)]
=
(
H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)l−1 (1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)
.
A more aggressive competition policy makes a duration of one period more likely:
f (1; η, σ ′′)
f (1; η, σ ′) =
(
1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)
> 1 ⇒ f (1; η, σ ′′) > f (1; η, σ ′).
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Perform the following steps:
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′) =
(
H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)l−1 (1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)
ln
(
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)
)
= (l − 1) ln
(
H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)
+ ln
(
1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
1 − H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)
.
Because
∂
∂l
ln
(
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)
)
= ln
(
H(ϕ∗(σ ′′))(1 − σ ′′)
H(ϕ∗(σ ′))(1 − σ ′)
)
< 0
and
∂
∂l
ln
(
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)
)
=
(
∂
∂l
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)
)
f (l; η, σ ′)
f (l; η, σ ′′) ,
we have
∂
∂l
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′) < 0.
To summarize, f (l; η, σ ′′)/f (l; η, σ ′) > 1 at l = 1 and f (l; η, σ ′′)/f (l; η, σ ′)
is decreasing in l.
Because
∑∞
l=1 f (l; η, σ ) = 1, it cannot be the case that f (l; η, σ ′′)/
f (l; η, σ ′) > 1 for some l and f (l; η, σ ′′)/f (l; η, σ ′) ≥ 1 for all l. It follows
that, generically, there exists l∗ ≥ 1 such that f (l; η, σ ′′) > (<)f (l; η, σ ′) as
l ≥ (<)l∗. f (l; η, σ ′) then first-order stochastically dominates f (l; η, σ ′′).
A similar argument shows that lower penalties—as reflected in reducing γ
from γ ′′ to γ ′—results in a FOSD shift of the distribution of cartel duration. First
we have
f (l; η, γ ′′)
f (l; η, γ ′) =
(
H(ϕ∗(γ ′′))(1 − σ)
H(ϕ∗(γ ′))(1 − σ)
)l−1 (1 − H(ϕ∗(γ ′′))(1 − σ)
1 − H(ϕ∗(γ ′))(1 − σ)
)
=
(
H(ϕ∗(γ ′′))
H(ϕ∗(γ ′))
)l−1 (1 − H(ϕ∗(γ ′′))(1 − σ)
1 − H(ϕ∗(γ ′))(1 − σ)
)
.
For l = 1, the first term equals 1 and so
f (1; η, γ ′′)
f (1; η, γ ′) =
(
1 − H(ϕ∗(γ ′′))(1 − σ)
1 − H(ϕ∗(γ ′))(1 − σ)
)
> 1,
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which implies f (1; η, γ ′′) > f (1; η, γ ′). Furthermore
sign
{
∂
∂l
f (l; η, σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)
}
= sign
{
H(ϕ∗(γ ′′))
H(ϕ∗(γ ′))
}
< 0.
Hence, there exists l∗ ≥ 1 such that f (l; η, γ ′′) > (<)f (l; η, γ ′) as l ≥ (<)l∗,
and, therefore, f (l; η, γ ′) FOSD f (l; η, γ ′′).
For the proof of Theorem 7, we want to show that f¯ (l; σ ′, σ ′′)FOSD f˜ (l; σ ′).
That is, for any l′,
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
<
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη. (A.2)
Note that the term on the right of the inequality can be expressed as follows.⎛
⎝
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎞
⎠ (A.3)
×
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
+
⎛
⎝
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′ − ∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎞
⎠
×
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
ηˆ(σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)
×
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′ − ∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη.
What we’ve done is to break apart the integration into
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
and
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
ηˆ(σ ′′) and then
multiplied the first term by
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
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and the second term by
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′ − ∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′ − ∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
.
Substituting equation (A.3) into equation (A.2), we then need to show
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη (A.4)
< υ
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
+ (1 − υ)
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
ηˆ(σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)×
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′ − ∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη,
where
υ ≡
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
.
Manipulating equation (A.4),
(1 − υ)
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
< (1 − υ)
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
ηˆ(σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′)
×
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′ − ∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη,
1434 Journal of the European Economic Association
which is equvalent to
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
f (l; η, σ ′)
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
<
l′∑
l=1
∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
ηˆ(σ ′′)
f (l; η, σ ′) (A.5)
×
⎡
⎣ (1 − β(0; η, σ ′))g(η)∫ ηˆ(σ ′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′ − ∫ ηˆ(σ ′′)
η
[1 − β(0; η′, σ ′)]g(η′)dη′
⎤
⎦ dη
Recall that if η′′ > η′ then f (l; η′, σ ) FOSD f (l; η′′, σ ) (Lemma 1). Hence,
except for η = ηˆ(σ ′′), f (l; η′, σ ′) < f (l; η′′, σ ′) for all η′ ∈ η ∈ [η, ηˆ(σ ′′)] and
all η′′ ∈ η[ηˆ(σ ′′), ηˆ(σ ′)]. It follows that (A.5) holds.
A.8. Proof of Theorem 8
Because f (l; η, σ ′) FOSD f (l; η, σ ′′) for all η ∈ [η, ηˆ(σ ′′)] (by Lemma 1), the
short-run distribution on cartel duration FOSD the long-run distribution.
References
Chen, Joe, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2007). “The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Pro-
gram on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.” In The Political Economy of Antitrust,
edited by Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek. Elsevier.
Connor, John M. (2007). “A Critique of Partial Leniency for Cartels by the U.S. Department
of Justice.” Working paper, Purdue University.
Cyrenne, Philippe (1999). “On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive
Behavior.” Review of Industrial Organization, 14, 257–272.
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr. (2004). “Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust
Authority.” RAND Journal of Economics, 35, 651–673.
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr. (2005). “Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust
Authority.” International Economic Review, 46, 145–169.
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr. (2008). “Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs.” Journal of
Industrial Economics, 56, 215–246.
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., and Joe Chen (2006). “Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability
and Endogenous Buyer Detection.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24,
1185–1212.
Levenstein, Margaret C., and Valerie Y. Suslow (2006). “Determinants of International Cartel
Duration and the Role of Cartel Organization.” Ross School of Business Paper No. 1052,
University of Michigan.
Miller, Nathan H. (2009). “Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement.” American Economic
Review, 99, 750–768.
Harrington and Chang Birth and Death of Cartels 1435
Rotemberg, Julio J., and Garth Saloner (1986). “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars
During Booms.” American Economic Review, 76, 390–407.
Selten, Reinhard (1973). “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, Where 4 are Few and 6
are Many.” International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 141–201.
Spagnolo, Giancarlo (2000). “Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws: How Leniency Programs Solve
Bertrand’s Paradox and Enforce Collusion in Auctions.” FEEM Working Paper No. 52.2000.
Spagnolo, Giancarlo (2008). “Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust.” In Handbook of
Antitrust Economics, edited by Paolo Buccirossi. The MIT Press.
Wils, Wouter P. J. (2007). “The European Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on Antitrust Fines:
A Legal and Economic Analysis.” World Competition Law and Economics Review, 30,
197–229.
